The institutional and institutional obstacles to the development of large-scale coal companies across regions In particular, the allocation of coal resources has not been fully market-oriented, a reasonable coal distribution mechanism has not been formed in the country, and local state-owned large-scale coal enterprises have become an important step for the government to achieve public goals. And so on, are barriers to the development of large-scale coal companies across regions. In addition, although the province of coal resources has made some explorations aimed at breaking through the trap of "resource advantages," it still needs to take a more active approach to resource allocation.

On a large scale, the local interests under the financial system of “Divided stoves” have been recognized and strengthened. Local governments have set interest bodies, economic agents, and management bodies in one place to form a strong local interest preference, and the region under the GDP performance evaluation system. Competition and so on are all deep-rooted reasons that cause large-scale coal companies to face difficulties in cross-regional development. From an industry perspective, the deep-seated reason is the distribution of huge coal interests. The allocation of coal resources has not been fully marketized, the country has not formed a reasonable coal distribution mechanism, coal has become a resource, and the provincial government has improved the overall strength of the local economy. Under such conditions as means, local governments are more willing to give coal resources to local state-owned enterprises for development.

The state stipulates that the allocation of coal resources is the transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights. Except for some exceptions, all localities are required to take a paid transfer in the form of market competition through bidding, auction, and auction. However, in actual operations, many regions did not adopt market competition methods, but instead deployed administrative means of agreement transfer. On the one hand, the new allocation of coal resources is basically a method of agreement transfer, and a small amount of bidding and auction methods are used. On the other hand, the acquired resources, that is, the transfer of established mining rights, must be approved by the government before they can be transferred. Local governments intervened in the transfer of mining rights through the establishment of a dominant position, and designated provincial coal enterprises (mostly state-owned coal enterprises) as mergers and reorganizations to integrate small and medium-sized coal mines through administrative means, but did not give priority to mergers and reorganizations of large-scale coal enterprises outside the province. identity of.

At present, China's coal resource taxes and taxes mainly include coal resource taxes, mineral resources compensation fees, exploration rights use fees and mining rights fees. These taxes and fees focus on compensating the economic value of the resources themselves, and the external costs of coal development have not been fully accounted for. The ecological environment compensation mechanism, the **** mechanism of landless farmers, industrial succession and development mechanisms have not yet been established. Shanxi Province began piloting coal sustainable development policies and environmental recovery and management margin policies in 2007, but these policies are still in trials and are not widely implemented throughout the country.

On the contrary, for the huge profits of the coal industry, the provinces are exploring the relevant distribution mechanism. Since 2004, some coal resources provinces have successively implemented the coal price adjustment policy, and continue to adjust during the implementation process. When the coal demand is strong and the price is high, the collection quota is increased. When the business climate is declining, the collection quota is lowered accordingly. Suspension of collection. The distribution mechanism of coal interests in various provinces is still in the process of exploration. It also has great arbitrariness and uncertainty. Under these circumstances, all localities tend to leave huge profits from the exploitation of coal resources in the region instead of being taken away by foreign companies as profits.

Most of the state-owned large-scale coal enterprises have good economic returns, and they are “cash cows” of local governments. Local governments often use them as an important means to achieve public goals, such as reorganizing difficult state-owned enterprises and promoting local economic development. Under the background that local state-owned large-scale coal enterprises have become a target for local governments to achieve public goals, the allocation of coal resources is directly related to local interests. This has led to the active mergers and acquisitions of coal enterprises within the province and the development of inter-provincial mining. Jointly difficult results.

Under the current unreasonable mechanism for distributing coal interests, the ability to pull the local economy through coal “foreign transportation” is continuously weakening, and a so-called “resource advantage trap” has been formed. Some provinces with traditional coal resources hope that more coal can stay in the local area to support the economic development of the region and truly take advantage of the advantages of the industry as an industrial advantage. We have made some positive explorations in policies, such as investing in resources and replacing resources with projects, and promoting coal companies to invest in non-coal industries. These policies have their own practical significance and rationality, but they need to explore more active resource allocation methods and should be combined with market allocation of resources. Otherwise, they will simply limit the entry of large-scale coal enterprises outside the province, which is not conducive to achieving a win-win situation. And transformation and development.

Countermeasures and suggestions To break through the institutional barriers to the development of large-scale coal companies across regions, we can absorb large-scale foreign coal enterprises with the necessary conditions into the main body of coal resources integration, speed up the improvement of the distribution mechanism of coal interests, relax the use of coal resources for transfer purposes, and accelerate the advancement of coal. The marketization of resource allocation runs, and it insists on the localization of large-scale coal companies' cross-regional development.

At present, in the course of China's economic restructuring, we must strive to deepen reforms in the direction of breaking the regional standard, building a unified market, and strengthening cooperation and resource sharing between different regions. It should actively introduce large-scale advantageous coal enterprises from other provinces. In the short-term, it can solve the shortage of capital, technology, and talent in the process of resource integration, especially the financial difficulties, which will help improve the efficiency of coal resource integration; in the long-term, it can leverage the power of coal companies in other cities. Comprehensive advantages will help promote the transformation and upgrading of the local coal industry. Although some resource provinces currently exclude foreign coal companies from the main body of integration, in fact, many foreign coal companies have also participated in the integration of resources through “by-pass” and “backdoor” methods, but they have paid high prices. transaction cost. Since some large-scale coal enterprises in other provinces also have strong expectations for cross-regional development, it is suggested that the integration of coal resources in the next step should gradually improve the distribution mechanism of coal interests and set relevant standards and conditions to attract large-scale foreign coal enterprises to become the main entity for integration. In provinces that have already completed the initial integration of resources, it is recommended that large-scale coal enterprises in other regions be attracted by allowing reasonable circulation of the main body status.

In improving the distribution mechanism of coal interests, we must first implement the ecological compensation and sustainable development mechanism for coal resource development, and second, we must improve the coal resource tax and coal price adjustment policy. At present, China's overall ecological compensation and sustainable development mechanism for coal resources development has not yet been established. There are only a small amount of compensation funds such as reclamation fees and mineral resources fees, but the amount is relatively small, which is far from meeting the requirements for restoration and treatment of the environment. Since 2006, Shanxi province has started trials to implement a comprehensive compensation mechanism for coal mining, extracting mine environmental restoration guarantee deposits and sustainable development for new and mining areas. The pilot has been in operation for nearly five years. From April 2007 to the end of 2010, Shanxi has collected a total of more than 500 billion yuan in sustainable development of coal, focusing on the management of ecological environment, the transformation of resource-based cities and the development of key industries. In order to solve the other social problems caused by coal mining and other three areas, the effect of using coal to make up the ecology, supplement agriculture, make up the urban construction and make up for other industries is significant. At present, it is necessary to sum up the experience of pilot projects and, in light of local development characteristics, implement a comprehensive compensation mechanism for coal mining throughout the country as soon as possible. In addition, all along, calls for the reform of the coal resources taxation method (from quantity to ad valorem) and raising the level of tax burden have been highly demanded, and the recently introduced "Provisional Regulations on Resource Tax" still maintains a specific measure. The method of levy. In this case, local governments should strengthen the implementation of the coal price adjustment policy, reform the way of collection (from quantity to ad valorem), in order to obtain more reasonable coal interests, and thus to change the current local government reliance on coal companies. To achieve some of the public goals.

In the course of advancing the marketization of coal resources allocation, many “resource-for-project” policies have emerged, which are essentially the same as “land-for-project” and “fund-for-funding projects”, and are all provided by the government for investment promotion. Preferential policies. In fact, many companies will quickly resell these resources to obtain funds after they have been allocated coal resources. Obviously, the coal resource trading market is existent and operational, and coal resources can be fully configured through market competition methods such as bidding, auctions, and listing. The key is to transfer more revenue to local governments, and to relax the use of local resources. These funds can be used for investment promotion in the form of government subsidies. This market-oriented allocation method is conducive to the concentration of resources to dominant coal companies and can avoid the disadvantages of coal resources flowing to non-coal enterprises under the “resource-for-project” approach. Of course, in the process of marketization, we must stop the act of speculating resources.

In addition, under the current conditions of significant changes in the coal development environment in some major resource provinces and the diversification of industrial targets, large-scale coal companies must adjust their strategies for cross-regional development, and they must shift from simply acquiring resources to localized operations. The so-called localization operation is not only the localization of employees and the localization of corporate culture. The key is the localization of business development. That is, we must closely integrate the transformation and upgrading of the coal industry in the region to conduct business: on the one hand, to extend the local coal industry. The chain will strengthen the comprehensive utilization of coal and on-site processing and conversion in the region; on the other hand, more profits from the coal mining industry will be left on the ground, and more non-coal industries will be reinvested locally to promote the region. Comprehensive and sustainable economic development.